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1
INTRODUCTION: FROM 
PERFORMANCE TO 
INVENTING THE SOCIAL
Noortje Marres, Michael Guggenheim, Alex Wilkie
across Many different doMains, efforts are underWay to reinvent 
ways of researching social life. Both in established fields of social inquiry, such 
as sociology and anthropology, and in disciplines such as art, design and archi-
tecture, there is an appetite for adventure, for moving beyond the customary 
distinctions between knowledge and art, and for combining the ‘doing’ ‘research-
ing’ and ‘making’ of social life in potentially new ways. Designers, architects 
and artists are now re-framing their practices as novel forms of social research 
(Rosner, forthcoming; Mazé 2013), while social and cultural researchers are 
taking up artistic instruments and techniques to research society by other than 
textual means, such as drawing and installation art (Wakeford and Lury 2012; 
Wilkie 2017). However, while the projects of conjoining sociology and design, 
and more generally of rethinking epistemic and aesthetic engagement with social 
life, are increasingly widespread, they have raised many unanswered questions, 
such as: What are the specific qualities of such endeavours and the entities they 
produce? Can the aims of artistic intervention and social inquiry really be aligned 
in research practices? Is it possible to contribute to both knowledge and art at 
once, and should we even wish to?
To address such questions, we would do well to consider more carefully 
specific examples of the above forms of social research. Thus, the overall aim 
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of this book is to introduce inventive approaches to social inquiry through 
the presentation of concrete projects and reflections on the contexts in which 
these projects are undertaken. At the outset, however, we want to offer a wider 
discussion of the intellectual background, methodological orientation and 
sensibilities that inform the projects and reflections presented here, and the 
commitment we think they have in common. Why use the term ‘invention’ in 
relation to social research? In what follows, we will describe the logics at work 
in the phrase ‘inventing the social’ and clarify what differentiates invention from 
innovation, and from performance, in relation to social life. We will argue that 
invention, unlike the other two terms, involves an active search for alternative 
ways of combining representation of, and intervention in, social life.
We will start by giving a brief introduction to what we take to be three key 
ingredients of established understandings of how social life is subject to design 
and artistic intervention. These approaches build on an old idea, namely that 
social life is not simply given – in the way that nature was previously assumed to 
be – but is performed, materially conditioned or constrained, and/or reflexive, 
i.e. it is transformable through knowledge, intervention and creativity. This will 
bring us to a discussion of the role of objects, technologies and environments in 
the accomplishment of social life, and of the difference between dominant ideals 
of the designability of social life and more inventive approaches to it. One of the 
main points we wish to make is that bringing together social research with arts 
and design practices makes possible new types of experimental intervention, that 
differ from narrow scientific experimentalism – moving away from from the idea 
that social science is able to engineer social phenomena like communities, col-
lective behaviour and publics. Here, what might be understood as experimental 
procedures take on a very different appearance from their normative significance 
in modern science. Inventive social research finds its starting point in the inherent 
creativity of social life, and advances a particular form of experimental inquiry: 
it attempts to purposefully deploy creative aspects of social life – including per-
formance, materiality, reflexivity – with the aim of rendering social phenomena 
interpretable and knowable. In the last part of this chapter we discuss what we 
view as markers of ‘good’ or pertinent inventions of sociality, namely experimen-
tation as imagination (section four) and material intervention (section five).
19
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Soc i a l  L i f e  a s  Togetherne s s : 
P e r format i v e ,  R e f l ex i v e ,  and  Mat er i a l
So, what does this rather awkward and counter-intuitive phrase ‘inventing the 
social’ mean? We want to start by considering some background assumptions 
shared by the contributions to this volume. Most important is the well-estab-
lished view in the social sciences that social life is not something that simply 
exists out there, but is made: the very existence of social life depends on specific 
practices of display, representation, accounting and enactment. Society is not 
like nature was long presumed to be, something that exists independently of 
human intervention and needs only to be represented in order to be known. 
Society is not given but done; indeed, it is often difficult to separate the doing 
and the knowing of social life. Take, for example, a wedding celebration. It is 
both a way of practising togetherness and of making visible, and representable, 
the various relations and actors involved. It is also a way of making new relations. 
Importantly, this insight into the role of social practices is nothing new: it has 
long been championed by social theorists, and can be variously traced back to 
the works of Max Weber, Gabriel Tarde, Alfred North Whitehead, John Dewey, 
John Austin, Ludwig Wittgenstein, Alfred Schütz, and Harold Garfinkel (for a 
discussion see Halewood 2014). According to these – in many respects very 
different – authors and the intellectual traditions they represent, social life is 
accomplished through rituals, representations, accounts, and dramatisations of 
togetherness: it is a consequence of our deliberate orientation towards others. 
In this view, then, there is no such thing as a society that exists independently 
of performative acts.1 Perhaps the most pertinent version of such a perspective 
is Garfinkel’s (1967) generous idea of the ‘methodical character’ of social life, 
and his claim that social life is accomplished through everyday practices of 
‘accounting for social life as part of social life’ (Thielmann 2012).
Different intellectual labels have been offered to identify this insight, from 
interpretative sociology to performance studies, but if we accept a looseness of 
terminology, we can say that they invoke the same basic idea: the active or delib-
erate curation, instantiation, representation and dramatisation of social bonds is 
critical to the very existence of the entity called society and the phenomenon of 
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sociability. Thus, it has been argued that social life has a dramaturgy (Goffman 
1959), is reflexive (Woolgar 1988), and is marked by looping effects between 
how people are labelled – say, as foreigners – and how they understand them-
selves (Hacking 1995). This is to say that the basic idea of what we might call 
the artificiality of social life has become fairly well established over the course 
of the twentieth century. However, it has been argued that current proposals to 
‘engineer’ social life, as in ‘smart’ urban laboratories, are raising new challenges 
for the understanding of social life as performed (e.g. Calvillo and Halpern 
2016). Contemporary phenomena like the rise of social media platforms, and 
the digital city, have granted fresh relevance to the idea that social life is artificial, 
as we will discuss in more detail below.
It is important to recognise that not only social research, but also arts and 
design disciplines have, for some time, drawn attention to the special role of 
technology and material entities – such as buildings – in the conduct and 
performance of social life. The idea of the materiality of social life is of crucial 
importance in understanding how invention may be a characteristic of social 
research. Sociologists and anthropologists have long argued that it is not just 
practices, rituals and ideas that inform the ongoing performance of social life, 
but also the settings (such as buildings), infrastructures (such as electricity and 
radio) and environments (mountains, cities, the air) in which it unfolds. In social 
research, this attention to materiality is today mostly associated with Actor-
Network Theory (ANT) (Michael 2016) and with anthropological approaches 
like material culture studies (Miller 1987; Hicks 2010). In social theory, ANT 
is known for introducing the concept of the non-human as an actor (Callon 
1986; Latour 1992). Here, the idea that society is performed or made becomes 
directly associated with material and technological practices of engineering and 
design, such as attempts to design an electric vehicle (Callon 1986) the instal-
lation of ‘sleeping policemen’ in the street (Latour 1992), and the famous ANT 
slogan ‘society is technology made durable’.2 However, as Calvillo reminds us in 
her contribution to this book, the idea that material practices contribute to the 
invention of social life is much older. The long history of architectural utopias 
and attempts to create new forms of society through buildings is testament 
to this idea (see also Guggenheim 2014). This realisation is also critical for 
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understanding why exchanges between social research and arts and design are 
becoming pertinent today. Or, to put it another way, architects and designers 
will not be surprised to hear it said that buildings and artefacts do things. ‘Of 
course they do things’ comes the reply – ‘it’s our job to make them do things!’. 
For designers and architects, the question is how things do things. Still, it is not 
self-evident how what architects and designers do ‘to’ society, relates to how 
sociologists understand it.
It is also increasingly recognised that social research itself, not just social life, is 
constituted by material practices (Lezaun 2007; Wyatt 2008). Drawing on John 
Austin’s philosophy of language, sociologists have argued that material devices 
initially developed by social scientists to represent society – such as focus groups 
or surveys – may actually influence the conduct of social life or even generate 
forms of sociality (Muniesa et al. 2007; Law, Ruppert and Savage 2013). Such 
studies of the performativity of research methods strive to reveal the myriad of 
practical and material interventions that lurk below the surface of the official 
endeavour to represent society. Some of this work has explicitly challenged 
the representational understanding of social research, arguing that knowledge 
objects, such as focus groups and opinion polls, do not just refer to external states 
of affairs, but may actively constitute the very phenomena they purport to repre-
sent, such as opinions and preferences (Osborne and Rose 1999). Performative 
perspectives on social research reveal a troubling circumstance: devices that 
ostensibly serve to report on social life in actual fact influence it. A stock market 
index or opinion poll does not simply re-present the state of the economy or the 
public, but actively enrols audiences in arrangements for knowing and acting on 
the economy and the public. Moreover, the reverse is also true: phenomena that 
ostensibly serve as occasions for the enactment of social and public life – say a 
public debate organised by government or policy actors – at the same time enable 
the production of data, analysis and knowledge about it (Lezaun and Soneryd 
2007). In short, devices that have been designed to represent a phenomenon – 
society, publics – actively work to shape or even create it.
Recent work that combines social research with arts and design practices 
builds on these insights into the performance of social life, but also moves beyond 
them. The implicit claim of performative analysis of social research devices is 
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that ‘social research is always already an intervention’ but that this is not suffi-
ciently appreciated in representational social science, and public discourse more 
widely (Law 2004). In this view, one needs to adopt a performative perspec-
tive – and its favoured research methodology, ethnography – to appreciate that 
observational social methods, such as survey research, do not simply represent 
social life, but act on and in it. By contrast, the project of inventing the social 
does not begin with a critique of the blind spots of representational [social] 
science, which must learn to acknowledge performativity. Instead, it begins 
with the idea that social life and social research are performed, and seeks to put 
this insight to use in a generative way, in collaboration with disciplines such as 
architecture, arts, computing and design. Here the starting point is not the for-
getting of intervention, which performative approaches can subsequently claim 
to recover, but engagement with the creative competencies of other disciplines, 
and the question of how social research may share in these creative competen-
cies. In our view, the difference between representational and performative 
approaches in social research methodology does not hinge on the question of 
whether research constitutes a form of intervention or not, but on the types of 
connection between representation and intervention that are made, enabled, 
and explored in social research. To acknowledge the performativity of social 
research is but a first step. To rethink social research based on this understand-
ing means to invent the social.
F rom  Analys ing  P e r format i v i t y 
to  Inv ent ing  th e  Soc i a l
Inventive approaches to social research explore different ways of combin-
ing doing, making and knowing social life, of connecting representation and 
intervention. In mixing social research and arts and design practices to this 
end, inventive research takes up a diverse range of techniques and methods, 
from the design of material displays for survey findings, as in the case of Lucy 
Kimbell’s ‘Pindices’ (2005), to the use of design prototypes to facilitate dis-
cussions of a public issue, as in Nold’s chapter (this volume) on the use of 
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participatory design to elicit views of local residents on noise pollution around 
Heathrow. Each of these projects is idiosyncratic, but they share an important 
feature highlighted in Lury and Wakeford’s (2012) introduction to the book 
Inventive Methods, which states that to inquire into a given phenomenon is to 
participate in it. For Lury and Wakeford, inventive methods are the means by 
which ‘the social world is not only investigated, but may also be engaged. […] 
To describe [methods] as inventive is to seek to realise the potential of this 
engagement, whether this is as intervention, interference or refraction’ (Lury 
and Wakeford 2012: 6). From this insight a number of critical questions arise: 
can social research serve as an occasion for inventive engagement with social 
life? If participation is in some sense inevitable, could social research actively 
contribute to generating sociality? Crucially, however, for Lury and Wakeford 
the purpose of inventive methods is not to design new forms of living together 
from scratch but ‘to enable the happening of the social world – its ongoingness, 
relationality, contingency and sensuousness – to be investigated’ (Lury and 
Wakeford 2012: 2). In formulating this proposal, Lury and Wakeford make an 
important move beyond the critique of representational social science, to pose 
the question of how the creative capacities of social research might be purpose-
fully or methodologically deployed.
Importantly, this invitation to combine social research and arts and design 
practices addresses an important contemporary ethical and political challenge 
that faces social research and design disciplines alike. As inventive research 
combines representing and intervening in social life, it offers a different vision 
of what it means to experiment on – or rather with – social life, one that may 
provide an alternative to more limited ideals of scientific experimentalism that 
have recently gained ascendency in voguish fields such as computational social 
science, behavioural governance, and smart city design. Indeed, this is a further 
reason why we must now move beyond the critique of representationalism. It 
seems to us that the performative proposition – the view that social methods 
do not merely describe social reality but actively inform and participate in its 
enactment – has now become a truism, as social research is today expected 
to be interventionist. In the wake of social media and other technologies, the 
idea that social life is somehow artificial, and can be curated, designed or even 
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engineered, has become increasingly prominent. Take for example the recent 
large-scale Facebook experiments, in which the social media platform deliber-
ately modified particular platform settings by introducing an ‘I voted button’ on 
election day, to see if voter turnout could thereby be increased, and more gener-
ally to demonstrate the degree to which ‘social behaviour is amenable to online 
intervention’ (Bond et al. 2012). Such experiments may not, strictly speaking, 
be new – indeed they invoke early twentieth-century experiments in deploy-
ing social network analysis for reform purposes (Mayer 2012; Guggenheim 
2012). They do signal, however, that the ideal of a purely representational social 
science is today less prominent in public discourses themselves and, in turn, 
that accounts – idealised or not – of experimental intervention in social life are 
becoming more so.
In this context, it becomes apparent why the critique of narrow scientific 
representationalism – of the view that social science merely represents phenom-
ena that exist independently out there in external reality – is at the very least 
incomplete. In light of the idealisation of the instrumental deployment of social 
science research (as discussed in Muniesa’s chapter on behaviouralism, this 
volume), what is required in addition is a critique of narrow scientific experi-
mentalism – of the idea that social science is able to engineer social phenomena 
like communities, networks and publics. This, we want to argue, is not a form of 
social research that participates, nor one that invents, insofar as it ignores the 
creativity of social life itself, treating it instead as a passive object of knowledge, 
control and optimisation. Retrospectively, one could say that the performative 
critique of representation – its insistence that social science actively shapes 
the phenomena that it purports to describe – only works insofar as the idea 
of interventionist social science, of social engineering and the malleability of 
society remains discredited. Only in that context could performative under-
standings of social research claim it as their special insight that social science 
does not merely represent but also intervenes in the social world. To be sure, 
performative studies of social research did reflect on the demise of the modern 
ideal of the malleability of society (Law 2004; see also Woolgar et al. 2009), but 
these reflections translated into a cultivated scepticism vis-a-vis purposeful and 
planned societal intervention as such.
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How do inventive approaches to social research address this situation? One 
way is by challenging methodological indifference, the way in which scientific 
methodology risks remaining unresponsive to the phenomenon under study 
(Stengers 2017). In this respect, there is another important difference between 
performative and inventive approaches in social research. Social studies of per-
formativity tend to frame social methods as an object of inquiry – they wish to 
demonstrate how social research, say a census, does not simply represent but 
enacts social reality (Law and Urry 2004). By contrast, inventive approaches 
tend to regard the enactment of social phenomena not as a topic to be exposed or 
described, but as a research task or challenge: can we do it? Can we contribute to 
the creative articulation of social phenomena (Guggenheim et al., this volume)? 
As we have noted, inventive approaches take to task not just representationalism 
but also interventionism: instrumentalist ideals of experimental intervention in 
society, such as the behavioural nudge policy pursued by the UK government, 
are founded on the passivity of social phenomena. It is presumed that social 
phenomena are out there to be known and acted upon. Inventive approaches 
deem this presumption not just ethically but also methodologically unsound: 
conducting research on society always means actively engaging with social set-
tings and actors – with techniques to which the researched are not indifferent. 
The contributions to this book take as their starting point the experimentality 
of social life. That is to say, following Matthias Gross, the authors treat society 
as an experiment: a ‘sociological perspective [that] has got nothing to do 
with the idea of sociologists as experimenters in white coats. It is rather to be 
understood as called forth by the observation that in modern societies, social 
practices increasingly present themselves as experiments via a willingness to 
remain open to new forms of experience’ (Gross and Krohn 2005: 80; see also 
Marres 2012). Inventive research takes this experimentality of social life as the 
occasion to reconfigure social research.
This is also to say that in shifting our attention away from the critique of 
social scientific representationalism as such, we do not move from represen-
tation to intervention as the primary concern. Instead we ask, what kinds of 
passages between representation and intervention are opened up by adopting 
an inventive approach to social life? An alternative experimentalism in social 
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research is still to be invented insofar as to engage in this type of social inquiry 
is to recognise that there are many possible inter-articulations between knowl-
edge and intervention. In making this point, we follow Lury and Wakeford’s 
insistence in Inventive Methods that research constitutes a form of participation. 
But we also differ from their approach. In choosing ‘inventing the social’ as the 
title for this book, we foreground a specific interest in not only the methods, 
but also the objects and objectives of creative forms of social inquiry.3 Many 
of the contributions to this book translate sociological ideas and sensibilities 
into arts and design research practices. Thus, Andre Jaque’s chapter deploys 
the sociological distinction between the backstage and the frontstage of social 
and public life, while Christian Nold draws on insights from social studies of 
science and technology in examining the ‘provocational capacities’ of techno-
logical devices to elicit public debate and issue articulation in a specific setting, 
namely a neighbourhood in the proximity of Heathrow airport affected by sound 
pollution. For others, the primary interest is in the possibility of exchange – of 
collaboration – between arts and design and social research. Our intended audi-
ence for this book is all those engaged in social and cultural research, design, 
computing, art and architecture who are interested in the exchange of capacities, 
knowledges and sensibilities between these fields, to make possible new ways 
of combining knowing, doing and intervening in social life.
In creatively combining representing and intervening, inventive approaches 
to social inquiry actively seek to transform the ongoing practices that constitute 
social life as occasions for social inquiry (Marres 2014). Inventive social research 
assumes the performativity of its methods in the curation of its objects of study 
(Wilkie 2014; Guggenheim 2015), and in doing so it can be seen to follow the 
Marx-inspired dictum that, although social studies have long described the per-
formative effects of social science concepts, methods and measures, the point 
is to deploy them (Marres and Moats 2015; Kimbell, this volume). In other 
words, the difference between performativity and invention is not only a theo-
retical, but also a methodological question to be addressed in specific practices 
of research. Once we consider the possibility that social research may curate, 
provoke, or even generate social formations, we may become curious about 
the creative potential of our own knowledge practices. What are the possible 
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roles that researchers can adopt in the curation of social situations, and how do 
and might they interact with various co-inventors, be they human – in the case 
of research subjects for example – or non-human, in the form of instruments, 
devices and so on? What role can tools and technologies play, from drawing 
pens to audio equipment (e.g. Michael 2004), prototypes and Twitter Bots (e.g. 
Wilkie et al. 2015), and hyperlinks, social media buttons, hashtags and Web 
scrapers (Rogers 2013) in the curation of social formations? And finally, what 
are the criteria of success of inventive social research?
Good  Inv ent ions :  Ex p e r im ent  a s  Imag inat ion
It should now be obvious that, in our view, inventive approaches to social 
research are experimental. Above we have specified this notion in terms of the 
commitment to combine representation and intervention in social research. 
Practically, this means applying the term in two ways. First, the willingness to 
try out new methods, practices and techniques that are different from those 
presumed to define or belong to a home discipline, whether, for example, sur-
veys or fieldwork in social research or modelling and prototyping practices in 
design and architecture. Second, taking an interest in forms of expression and 
knowledge that do not merely seek to represent social reality but seek to ‘make 
visible phenomena in a form in which they could never possibly be lived, never 
otherwise made manifest’ (Brown 2012: 69).4 Experimental social research 
seeks to articulate social phenomena not simply through describing them but by 
deliberately modifying settings and by inducing or provoking actors to behave 
and express themselves in ways they would probably not of their own accord. 
However, it is important to emphasise that the development of experimental 
approaches to social research is not just about adopting experimental methods 
from the natural sciences. As noted, invention entails a departure from methodo-
logical indifference to the object of inquiry – an affirmation that social research 
involves active participation in social life. If to inquire is to participate, and it 
is impossible to avoid intervention, then we may as well try to become good at 
it, i.e. to learn the artful diligence and response-ableness of experimentation. 
28
inventing the social
Furthermore, if the imperative of clinical intervention is to improve a medical 
disorder – a definition that, arguably, informs how intervention is commonly 
understood – then what new kinds of intervention does creative experimentation 
make possible: does it ameliorate, add, enhance, provoke, reverse, challenge, 
accommodate?
Among those who have developed an experimental methodology specifically 
for social research, the aforementioned and pioneering ethnomethodologist 
Harold Garfinkel stands out. He famously noted that in order to understand 
society, we need to conduct experiments as ‘aids to our sluggish imagination’ 
(Garfinkel 1967: 38): to render visible what is going on in social situations 
it is not enough to carefully describe what happens, we must also provoke 
accounts. If we want to really grasp social processes we must somehow invite, 
persuade, or (to put it more strongly) provoke actors and situations to gener-
ate accounts, and to produce expressions and articulations of social reality. 
However, and as the sociologist Alvin Gouldner (1970) has pointed out, there 
are remarkable similarities between, on the one hand, Garfinkel’s interven-
tionist approach and, on the other hand, interventions in social and public 
life undertaken under the rubric of performance art and activism. Gouldner 
gives the example of the provocative methods used by the Amsterdam-based 
Provo movement to render visible the true nature of society. Provo mobilised 
a visible and material police force by releasing a small number of chickens on 
the Prinsengracht in Amsterdam one Saturday morning, thereby demonstrat-
ing the fear and anxiety of the Amsterdam authorities (Gouldner 1970; see 
also Marres 2012).
But what is arguably more apparent today than it was in the 1970s is the 
experimentality of social life itself: not just artists and activists, but also every-
day actors themselves continuously engage in experimentation on (with) our 
forms of living, behaviours and habitats – as in living experiments, in mundane 
forms of digital self-presentation (social media), and in a wider turn to what 
Francisca Gromme (2015) refers to as ‘governance by pilot’. In this context, 
the question for social researchers and knowledge practitioners more generally 
becomes: what can we add to experiments already underway (Guggenheim 
et al., this volume; Marres 2012)? Awareness of the experimentality of social 
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life changes what it means to undertake experiments in social research. In this 
context, it makes sense to adopt a minimal definition of experimental social 
inquiry, one that foregrounds the tactical modification of social settings, archi-
tectures and situations in order to render explicit latent social phenomena. As 
such, to experiment, first and foremost, means to intervene in social life, not 
necessarily with an instrumental goal in mind but to highlight social formations 
(Kimbell, this volume). Neither is the aim necessarily to scale the experiment 
up to a population, but rather to make visible, audible and tangible collective 
processes and problems that would otherwise be invisible, remain latent or 
exist as virtual phenomena, or in potentia (Savranksy, this volume; Lezaun et 
al. 2017).
While this definition is in need of further development, this way of fram-
ing the methodology of inventive social inquiry can help to clarify the relation 
between knowledge and creativity in these practices. Crucially, inventive social 
research does not proceed by adding creativity to more traditional, evidence-
based forms of social research. The very idea that social research suffers from 
a creative deficit that needs to be addressed in order to make social research 
more engaging is, in our view, misguided. There are plenty of fictions, visions, 
and fantasies already at work in social research. The notion of a creativity 
deficit wrongly suggests a strict opposition between forms of knowledge and 
intervention grounded in facts and those that are grounded in the imagination. 
As philosophers of science such as Karl Popper, Alfred North Whitehead and 
Isabelle Stengers have long reminded us, imagination is not the opposite of truth; 
fiction is not the opposite of fact. Inquiry (knowledge) requires imagination. As 
Stengers (2002) pointed out in her retelling of Galilei Galileo’s classic physics 
experiments, science always starts with an idea, a fiction, a ‘what if?’ What if 
weight made no difference to the velocity with which things fall?
The deployment of the imagination, and the generation of phenomena that 
are not given in the world, is not something that an inventive approach adds to 
empirical research – it is an approach and material reality that the arts, sciences 
and humanities have long shared. As the design researcher Daniela Rosner 
(forthcoming) points out, design, too, ‘is always asking “what if?’” of the social 
worlds it inhabits: it imagines scenarios, tries out different shapes and ways of 
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doing things. However, Rosner also insists that asking ‘what if ’ – introducing 
new scenarios and prototypes into social life – does not mean losing one’s inter-
est in what is already given in the world: it does not entail a shift from loyalty 
to ‘what is’ to ‘what might be’; and it does not mean exchanging empiricism for 
speculation (Savransky et al. 2017). Instead, as Marsha Rosengarten shows in 
her contribution to this volume, practising inquiry by way of creative interven-
tion is about engaging with what is already ongoing, already happening in the 
world with an explicit view to what might be in the world in a different mode. 
And this project does not belong to any one discipline, but is best understood 
as a shared undertaking across fields. Inventive inquiry may be pursued with 
the aid of social research methods such as participant observation, as well as 
through art and design practice. Its aim is to develop new ways of deploying the 
imagination as a method for knowing and intervening in social life, and to this 
end a variety of methodological traditions can be mobilised.
Good  Inv ent ions : 
Mat er i a l i t i e s  and  T echn ic i t i e s
The role of the imagination covers one aspect of the kinds of experiments that 
distinguish inventive approaches to understanding social life from descriptive, 
performative approaches. Another important feature is that material, aesthetic 
and technical milieus enable distinctive kinds of interactions with users, audi-
ences and institutions of social research. An imaginary that is materialised in 
artefacts, architectures and everyday devices has different qualities than imagi-
nations that are materialised in texts or laboratory set-ups. The ‘what if?’ of a 
tract on socialist utopia or a physics experiment is relatively difficult to engage 
with unless you do not need to wait for your revolution, or are trained in the 
field, but the ‘what if?’ of an app or a sweater can be tested very quickly. To 
create imaginative experiments, we need the right – meaning well-designed – 
devices. Social research now takes account of the materiality of the social in 
many different ways. However, we need to go further than this: the pressing 
question today, in our view, is whether social research can reflexively deploy 
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things, environments and non-humans to make an ostensible difference to our 
forms of life, and to how we live together.
It is now commonplace to point out that non-humans actively participate 
in social life. For example, we typically interact with bots on our phones, we 
find their messages in our inboxes and we are lured into bot-enhanced advertis-
ing, marketing and lobbying in our everyday interactions on social media, and 
many of us reflect on these novel yet mundane circumstances. Remarkably, 
however, even if non-humans are acknowledged as a significant presence in 
social life, this does not mean that society is now widely recognised as being 
hybrid – involving a co-mingling of humans and machines. On the contrary, 
human forms of sociability are, on the whole, firmly upheld and prioritised in the 
world of designed sociability. Examples of this, such as social media platforms, 
tend to materialise distinctively human forms of social organisation (Marres 
& Gerlitz, this volume): the friend network, the community, social behaviour. 
Contemporary forms of designed sociality tend to invoke classic social forms. 
This is another reason why we want to affirm experimentality, and why we need 
to exercise our skills in other than descriptive/observational forms of inquiry. 
It is not enough to empiricise the question of the social (Boltanski 2011), and 
to describe the social theories invoked by the actors themselves to account for 
social life. Now that we have established the generative capacities of devices, 
objects and settings in social life, the question arises: how does their participation 
in social life make a difference to our forms of life; can they inspire alternative 
forms of knowing and doing? This experimentalisation of social life is inherently 
in question (this is part of what makes an experiment): we do not already know 
how to conduct, understand and change contemporary social life, and no one 
knows what forms of inquiry and intervention are the most adequate for this 
purpose (not even the actors themselves).
To adopt an inventive approach to social inquiry, then, is not to jump on the 
technological determinist bandwagon and to believe that it is new technologies 
that have the power to produce new societies. Rather, the aim is to create experi-
ments that can serve to articulate, explicate and elaborate ways of (not) living 
together that are already ongoing. As many of the contributions to this book 
show, the experimental explication of social forms often depends on tactical (as 
32
inventing the social
well as literal) operations upon materialities: moving materials from the cellar 
to the exhibition space ( Jaque, this volume), or exchanging bricks with helium 
(Calvillo, this volume), or, for that matter, the re-programming of bots (Wilkie 
& Michael, this volume), or introducing soft toys to a medical measuring tool 
(Guggenheim, Kroell and Kraftner, this volume).
Jaque’s paper offers a fascinating account of the type of experimental rene-
gotiation of social forms that we have in mind. His Barcelona Pavilion experi-
ment produced a form of assembly that went against the organisational forms 
and logics of the social composed and given concrete form by self-appointed 
executors of the ideas of the architect Mies van der Rohe (the ‘Mies Society’): 
their obsession with stabilisation and purification was exposed as limited in 
scope and un-lively. Jaque’s pavilion intervention demonstrates the cost of 
stabilisation, exposing how this commitment rendered particular kinds of 
assembly invisible and impracticable. However, his attempt to address this by 
staging some of these invisible assemblies in the pavilion also comes at a cost, 
as it threatens to render un-doable particular modes of assembly like the Mies 
Society. This is an excellent example of the ‘coming out of things’ (Marres, 
2012): the outing of hybrid collectives and the explication of experimental 
forms of togetherness by way of material intervention. It also demonstrates a 
political truth: that the work of re-assembling the social is likely to generate 
tensions and conflicts; one society’s assembly, to put it somewhat inelegantly, 
is another’s dis-assembly.
Many of the material inventions described in this volume are modest and 
low-key: the experimental practices of social research we are presenting here do 
not aspire to the heroic design of large-scale knowledge infrastructures. Rather, 
ad-hocism, bricolage, hacking, glitching and prototyping are the interventions of 
choice ( Jencks and Silver 1973; Corsín, Jimenez and Estalella 2010). Certainly, 
this is partly due to the financial restrictions researchers are under. The nimble-
ness and playfulness enabled by small-scale interventions also have a deeper 
connection to experimental practices: preferring to be materially and resource 
light, such endeavours do not wish to impose their inventions on the world, 
but rather to operate in the mode of making material suggestions, offerings, and 
attempts at indicating that a different society is possible.
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Conclu s ion
In sum, then, inventive approaches to social research must be distinguished 
both from performative social studies and from attempts to reinstate social 
engineering as a viable paradigm. On the one hand, inventive approaches do not 
seek to describe the performance of social reality, but rather treat performativ-
ity as an effect that may be purposefully deployed in social research. However, 
to move from performance to invention does not require the endorsement of 
the simplistic ideal of the designability of social life. Inventive social inquiry 
precisely seeks to carve out an alternative to the ideal of the designable society. 
The two approaches, or experimental regimes, if you will – designability versus 
invention – are markedly different, in two ways: first, from the standpoint of the 
designable society, experimental capacities are an attribute of technical appa-
ratuses or architectures. It is the online platform, or the smart city architecture 
that is presumed to enable experimental intervention into an external object 
(society) – as for example in recent policy preoccupations where creativity as 
an economic object can be stimulated by urban planning (Farías and Wilkie 
2015: 2). Inventive approaches, by contrast, find their starting point in the 
experimentality of social life and social situations themselves.
From the standpoint of the designability of society, the latter are presumed 
to be largely passive, they are to be acted upon by technology and innova-
tion, and technology is assumed to align itself with this purposeful invention. 
Here the assumption is that the social world will comply with the goals of 
social design (‘and if it won’t we’ll try something else’). By contrast, inventive 
approaches to social inquiry are para-instrumental: they expect social situa-
tions to push back against our social theories, and they deliberately look for 
recalcitrance in materials and situations: the aim is to press societies’ ‘buttons’ 
and in doing so to activate latent social realities. Here, resistance is not noise, 
and neither is it simply anarchic: it has methodological value. The aims and 
goals of experimental social inquiry are here assumed to require situational 
adjustment. This, indeed, is what social research is all about: the adjustment 
of the practices and aims of inquiry during the process of research signals that 
we have learnt something.
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Note s
1 A word of caution is necessary here regarding the performance of social life. For Austin 
(1962), performativity in language – statements that bring into being states of affairs, 
such as marriage or war – require particular ‘felicity conditions’, meaning that certain 
circumstances need to obtain in order for them to work. For example, they may need 
to be pronounced by an appropriate actor (priest, head of state) or in a particular place 
(a church or press conference). If these conditions of felicity are not in place, then such 
statements will not ‘act’ appropriately, i.e. they will not work.
2 Things quickly become complicated, however, when, for instance, actor-network 
theorists such as Bruno Latour disavow the concept of the social. Latour mischievously 
adopted Margaret Thatcher’s phrase that there is no such thing as society (Latour 2005). 
As Marres and Gerlitz suggest in their contribution, ‘inventing the social’ can also be 
framed as a project to recover the specificity of social forms in the face of ANT’s (and 
Thatcherite) indifference.
3 Lury and Wakeford are interested in invention as a property of method. In their 
account, method is what constitutes the interface between social research and art. In 
presenting invention in this light, their approach has the advantage of foregrounding the 
question of how research operates in the world, but it also has the effect of suspending, 
or downplaying, the question of what forms of collaboration and types of exchange are 
possible between social research and creative disciplines in the practice of social research. 
Reinstating the more abstract notion of ‘method’ inevitably distracts from – and at times, 
brackets – the issue of collaboration, the exchanges of competencies that are possible 
between the domains, fields, sites, technologies and genealogies of social research, design, 
art, and architecture.
4 In this regard, inventive social inquiry returns us to a classic maxim of structuralist 
sociology: to gain knowledge of society requires the explication of dynamics that are not 
readily observable.
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